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JOINT LEADERSHIP DOCTRINE FOR THE STRATEGIC LEADER

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June 28 1990

An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

by

Lieutenant Colonel Alan A. Fox, FA

Colonel Greg Snelgrove, AVN
Project Advisor

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ABSTRACT

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Civilian and military literature is replete with material addressing the familiar topic of leadership. The vast majority of that material focuses on the skills, attributes, competencies and characteristics essential for leaders involved in organizational or direct leadership positions. While the topic of senior or executive leadership has been addressed through the biographies of senior leaders and other anecdotal works, there is surprisingly very little in print, and virtually no Joint military doctrine, that addresses the realm of the strategic leader. The strategic leader will be considered to be that officer serving as a CINC of a Unified or Specified command. The question of a 'third dimension' of leadership, the realm and environment of the strategic leader, above the operational and tactical will be addressed. In view of the dearth of JCS leadership doctrine, the origins of the problem of this doctrinal void will be examined and available service literature on strategic or executive leadership will be assessed for possible inclusion in future Joint doctrine. Recent research of active duty general officers by the Army Research Institute, as well as contemporary thinking from the world of business, will be appraised for its utility and suitability. A proposal for future Joint doctrine on the subject of strategic leadership will be presented.

Appropriate talent is needed at all levels if distinguished service is to be performed. But history and posterity reserve the name of "genius" for those who have excelled in the highest positions - as commanders in chief - since here the demand for intellectual and moral powers are vastly greater.

Carl Von Clausewitz
On War, p. 111.

In an era characterized by virtually limitless progress in the sciences and significant advancements in understanding many dimensions of human behavior, the military should have made broad application of that knowledge to its own leadership needs. Although virtual libraries of reports and serious studies have been accumulated and thoughtfully analyzed, the clear focus of that reporting has been on the direct and organizational aspects of leader behavior pertaining principally to the pragmatic considerations for getting things done in an effective and efficient manner. Only recently have researchers and students of history begun to focus their attention on a neglected dimension of the leadership equation. That dimension has heretofore either been assumed away as a 'given', or put into the box of the too difficult to understand, the irrelevant or the esoteric. It has been variously labeled as that which pertains to the 'senior leader', the 'high level' leader, the 'strategist' or the 'executive'. Certainly part of the problem has been in

defining precisely what we mean when we broach the subject of that individual who shoulders the broadest and most comprehensive responsibilities at the highest echelons within the military. It is my contention that there exists a level of leadership above the operational so special and unique as to demand a separate treatment in our doctrine. This paper will address the question of that third dimension and propose a direction for filling the doctrinal void.

The process for this effort will be to first discuss the question of levels of leadership, particularly as they relate to the issue of the existence of a level above the operational. After confirming that such a level does exist, though not presently articulated in any formal way in Joint military doctrine, we will proceed to describe the environment, the unique challenges, and particular requirements for effective service at that elevated echelon. We will look not only to our very familiar military backyard of centuries of warfighting experience, but will inquire also into the contemporary world of business where a similar strategic level also exists, seeking application as appropriate for the professional soldier. A research-based leadership model of recent design will be discussed which holds great promise for future study and possible use as the basis for Joint military

leadership doctrine. Competencies and attributes of the strategic leaders serving in Joint and Combined commands will be described and a basic concept for developing the most senior military executives will be presented.

Levels of Leadership

. . . the qualities that enter into the exercise of generalship in action have the power, in a very condensed period of time, to determine the life or death of thousands, and sometimes the fate of nations . . .

Barbara Tuchman
Parameters Spring 1972, p.3.

It is not simply an academic exercise to attempt to understand and define the functions and imperatives of leaders at the various levels of responsibility. The continued existence of our nation as a sovereign entity, the freedoms enjoyed by its citizens, and our very way of life may ultimately be determined by the manner in which the most senior military commanders perform their duties. To assert that there are minimal differences between effective leaders at the battalion level and those at the strategic would be to ignore the rich historical heritage which discloses discrete and distinct levels of operation for military commanders. We can turn to Clausewitz for an authoritative opinion on the subject

when he notes that "every level of command has its own intellectual standards; its own prerequisites for fame and honor . . . There are commanders-in-chief who could not have led a cavalry regiment with distinction, and cavalry commanders who could not have led armies."¹ While leaders at corps level and below may have won the campaigns, battles and engagements, it was the theater commander, the commander-in-chief, who frequently provided the overarching strategic vision, concept and strength of will which provided the true foundation for the eventual mission success. Eisenhower's orchestration of the invasion campaign along the Normandy coastline in 1944 as the Supreme Commander exemplified both the challenge of strategic leadership as well as its unique nature. When all was said and done, the ultimate responsibility for the success or failure of Operation Overlord, history's most complex, multi-dimensional combined and unified invasion, would rest with one man, pointing clearly to a very unique dimension and level of leadership indeed. Napoleon's special characteristics of intellectual brilliance, knowledge of campaign planning, self-confidence and boldness combined to produce a strategic leader of unparalleled magnificence and effectiveness. His victories at Ulm, Austerlitz and Jena were incredibly masterful works of military genius demonstrating the difference that one man of

exceptional capacity in a vital position of responsibility can make in the conduct of warfare. Other strategic leaders and CINCs, such as MacArthur, Stillwell, Rommel and Marshall each in their own way have exhibited the special characteristics of personality, intellect and temperament associated with the most effective senior military executives. One need only to look to history, then, to conclude definitively that there is indeed a distinct level of leadership that is at the very pinnacle of the military hierarchy and is performed effectively by a relatively small number of military personnel. That individual we know as the strategic leader.

In a contemporary military context the strategic leader can be readily identified as the four star officer serving in a position of vital importance and significance to our nation's defense. He is often the individual who personally interfaces with the political and military structures of government, both domestically and internationally. He implements policy decisions by the application and employment of military forces within a Unified or Specified Command. His environment is typically ambiguous and complex, as it involves forecasting and predicting needs and requirements into an uncertain and distant future. In wartime, the strategic leader plans and conducts campaigns in his assigned area of responsibility and is

responsible for their ultimate success or failure. He is intellectually gifted and in possession of a unique combination of traits of character and temperament rarely found in any one individual. The strategic leader frequently is the only individual, based on maturity, cognitive ability and breadth of professional experience, capable of assimilating the totality of factors in a given environment and able to provide a vision and articulation of the needed outcome or course of action. No one else can do the job of the strategic leader. He is, in many very real ways, indispensable. We need to know more about him and his operating environment so as to insure that when he is gone there will be others of similar capacity and talent available to take his place.

The existence of a 'third level' of leadership above the operational level is clear. It is essential that this 'new' dimension be officially acknowledged, analyzed, defined and formally included in our professional literature and military studies as it represents the apex of our profession to which many leaders will aspire but to which only a select few will rise.


DA PAM 600-80 states that these are three basic leadership domains, the direct, the organizational and the executive,² as shown in Figure 1,³ in which leader's skills are developed and

practiced. These correspond to the domains described by Dr. Elliott Jacques in his research for the Army in 1984 on the subject of "cognitive abilities of leaders, commanders and staff officers at various organizational levels."⁴ The direct leader is concerned with rules, regulations, and one-on-one interpersonal contact, while the organizational leader establishes policy, procedures and actually operates key systems. The leader in the executive domain focuses on culture, policy and system design.

Jacques further subdivides the three domains into seven levels of leadership, as shown in Figure 2,⁵ which provides a mechanism to describe the cognitive abilities of leaders at various organizational levels. What is clear from this figure is the distinct time spans, organizational levels and cognitive requirements for various leaders throughout the spectrum. It also provides us a useful tool for focusing in on the unique aspects of a particular level of command.

According to Jacques, cognitive ability is defined as "the scale and complexity of the world which an individual is able to pattern and construct, including the amount and complexity of the information being processed."⁶ It is not the same as intelligence, but increases over time with experience and maturity and is an essential factor for effective

performance at each new level of responsibility. The four star CINC must be at cognitive level VII and must "create a strategic context for the development or deployment of complex systems".⁷ Jacques describes the cognitive requirements essential for each level of organization and, importantly for the Army or Joint doctrine writers, states that "people can be classified, beginning between ages 20 and 25, as to the potential highest level of cognitive complexity which is attainable for them."⁸ If this is true, then the Army is in possession of a valuable tool, heretofore unused, which could provide the individual officer and the institution an idea early in a officer's career of his future potential in terms of his cognitive capability. Jacques's theories hold great promise for military application and should be actively evaluated for possible inclusion in future service and Joint publications on strategic leadership. His theory and research scientifically validate the existence of a third dimension of leadership above the operational, and are consistent with other contemporary research and the historical literature which points to a special capability, among others, to handle severe complexity at the highest echelon of military service.



GENERAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS BY ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL

STRATUM	TIME SPAN	GENERAL TASK REQUIREMENTS	TOE GRADE	DOMAIN
VII	20+ YRS	CREATES COMPLEX SYSTEMS ORGANIZES ACQUISITION OF MAJOR RESOURCES; CREATES POLICY	GENERAL	SYSTEMS/ STRATEGIC
VI	10+ YRS	OVERSEES OPERATION OF SUB-ORDINATE SYSTEMS; APPLIES POLICY	LT GEN	
V	6+ YRS	DIRECT OPERATION OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS	MAJ GEN	GENERAL COMMAND
IV	2+ YRS	TAILOR RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS TO INTERDEPENDENT SUBORDINATE PROGRAMS OR UNITS	BRIG GEN/COL	
III	1+ YRS	DEVELOP AND EXECUTE PLANS TO IMPLEMENT POLICY/ASSIGNED MISSIONS	LT COL	DIRECT COMMAND
II	3+ MONTHS	DIRECT PERFORMANCE OF WORK; ANTICIPATE/SOLVE REAL TIME PROBLEMS	CPT, LT	
I	LESS THAN 3 MONTHS	HANDS-ON WORK PERFORMANCE USE PRACTICAL JUDGMENT TO SOLVE ONGOING PROBLEMS	NCO/SM	

The Doctrinal Void

Is it too bold to assert that there is no current doctrine on the subject of leadership for the strategic level war fighter? The reality of that assertion should be somewhat disconcerting to leaders of our military services, and particularly the Congress, in view of the many legislative and organizational changes and initiatives precipitated and ordered by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. The ultimate goal of that legislation was to provide the framework and structure for more effective joint military planning in times of peace and successful warfighting in times of armed conflict.⁹ Recent effective joint operations in Panama clearly indicate that many of the organizational, command and control and inter-service parochialisms that had plagued U.S. military force employments in the not-so-distant past have been eliminated since introduction of the new law. Joint operations and warfighting are now being conducted in accordance with the doctrine which is found in revised JCS publications, much of which represents the 'new thinking' needed for effective Joint and Combined military performance. Interestingly, however, to date no single Joint publication has been written which addresses the subject of the leadership responsibilities,

imperatives, environment and characteristics of the strategic leader operating as a warfighter in a complex military organization.

Perhaps one of the reasons for the dearth of doctrine on this subject may have to do with the opinion of informed, seasoned military leaders who have critically watched the evolution of leadership theory in recent history and share the view of a political scientist who dejectedly noted in 1984 that "virtually anything that can be said about leadership can be denied or disproved. Leadership studies, to the extent they exist, are unscientific. Countless paradoxes and contradictions litter every manuscript on leadership".¹⁰ While efforts in the past have failed to provide an appropriate theoretical and scientific basis for military doctrine on strategic leadership, there is reason to believe that great progress has been made in recent years in the systematic investigation of the subject and that the time is right for filling the doctrinal void.

There are several reasons why joint doctrine which identifies the requirements for leadership at various levels of responsibility and command is needed, particularly at the three and four-star joint warfighter level. Doctrine serves as "a basis for formal leader development efforts"¹¹ and it can "aid

in the identification of individuals with the requisite ability and skills to advance to higher rank."¹² Both of these reasons are extremely important to every individual military service, as well as the joint warfighter, and merit amplification.

Leader development in the services today is accomplished through a combination of professional military schooling, coaching and mentoring by seniors, and formal evaluation and assessment via the efficiency or fitness report. The Army's objective setting and periodic progress review processes with the rater complement its total program. These programs taken together have been effective in producing the officers of exceptional capacity and highest quality who now occupy the senior leadership positions in the military. This professional development system could be improved even further by the adaptation at the level of the JCS of "an integrated and sequential leadership doctrine beyond company level based on a clearly articulated leadership philosophy (which) could provide the foundation for formal leadership instruction at the Command and General Staff College, the Army War College and even the General Officer Orientation."¹³

The second reason why the JCS should develop leadership doctrine is that "it could aid in the identification of individuals with the requisite ability and skills to advance to

the highest rank."¹⁴ As we have shown, leadership at the level of the four-star CINC is not the same as that at lower levels, and there are even significant qualitative differences between the functions and environments of three and four star commanders. It is vitally important, then, to the continued effectiveness of the military as an instrument of policy to have only those individuals of truly exceptional capacity and talent serve in the most senior command positions for which their talents and temperaments make them particularly and uniquely well suited.

Joint leadership doctrine would describe the characteristics, capabilities, competencies and skills needed at each level of command and would focus on those factors of special relevance to the Unified and Specific Commanders. This articulation would provide raters and senior leaders a basis for evaluating subordinates who may have demonstrated exceptional promise and ability early in their careers. It could materially contribute to the identification and selection of the right general officer for the right command. It could guide military schools, institutions and other leader development components in DOD. Evolving Joint warfighting doctrine delineates the need for a broad variety of literature and philosophy on Joint matters, but interestingly addresses the issue of leadership only indirectly.

JCS PUB. 0-1, BASIC NATIONAL DEFENSE DOCTRINE (Initial draft dated 17 November 1989) provides critical definitions, but fails to establish the need for Joint doctrine on leadership. It states that "doctrine is the accepted body of professional military knowledge. Joint Doctrine should move to standardize terminology, relationships, responsibilities and processes among all services in order to focus efforts on solving specific problems. Joint doctrine should establish consensus on those areas which require inter-service unity of effort and on which, in circumstances removed from the actual event, the CJCS in consultation with the other Joint Chiefs of Staff believe agreement is necessary."¹⁵ Since virtually every aspect of the military operational equation is either the direct or indirect result of a leader's action, a clearly articulated and theoretically sound doctrinal basis is essential to any expectation of effective military performance. This is particularly true in the contemporary context of great service inter-dependence and reliance. JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) also points to the need for doctrine on Joint-level leadership when, in discussing the concept of Unity of Effort, it states that "effective use of the military powers of the nation requires that the efforts of the separate Military Services be closely integrated",¹⁶ and

again in the draft JCS Pub 0-1, "Joint Doctrine provides an existing joint agreement on ways to unify military action."¹⁷ JCS Pub 0-1 does make an effort to speak to the leader's functions, but does so only in the broadest, most generic terms and fails to describe the context of the strategic warfighter or the unique characteristics and leadership attributes of a CINC which contribute to his ability to function effectively in a Joint and often Combined theater of war.

Along with the disconcerting reality of the DOD's and JCS's failure to develop or order the development of strategic leadership doctrine comes the question of the separate military service's treatment of the subject. Have perhaps the Army or the Marine Corps in their collective wisdom have recognized the value of developing leadership doctrine, addressing the full spectrum of factors associated with the most senior commander and his position? A search for service doctrine on the subject reveals, sadly, the existence of very little meaningful literature, and virtually no published doctrine. The Army is the only service that appears to have any interest in the subject at all and has fielded several valuable documents which approach the subject of strategic leadership, but which fail to fully address the complete spectrum of considerations needed for an appropriate treatment in a doctrinal statement.

A superb document for the operational commander and leader is found in Army Field Manual 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, published recently (1987) and presently in use at the Army War College as a primary reference text for leadership instruction. FM 22-103's purpose and scope are to "establish a doctrinal framework for leadership and command at senior levels within the context of the tactical and operational (emphasis added) levels of war discussed in FM 100-5."⁸ It clearly is not specifically intended for the most senior military leader in a Unified or Specified Command, although its discussion of various concepts, leader attributes, tasks and competencies have application to all leaders. The manual's principal shortcoming as a potentially good first cut on strategic leadership is its failure to differentiate the levels of leadership and to acknowledge the existence of a level of responsibility above that of the operational. Airland Battle Doctrine itself, however, may be the real root of this problem. ALB does not address a level of war above the operational, and thus Army leadership doctrine in its present state is a direct reflection of its warfighting focus which is at the Corps (three star commander) and below. The Army's vision of future military operations is expanding, however, as it has begun to develop warfighting doctrine for the theater

commander as seen in FM 100-6 (Coordinating Draft), Large Unit Operations, hopefully signaling the need for a concurrent review of its doctrinal treatment of strategic leadership as well.

DA Pamphlet 600-80, Executive Leadership, is the most complete military publication in print today on the subject of senior level leadership. It goes beyond FM 22-103 in its description of the "responsibilities and forms of reference required at the most senior levels of the Army"¹⁹ and envisions the Army's most senior executive leaders functioning in an environment above the operational. Of all the DOD literature on leadership, this pamphlet holds the greatest promise for becoming the base document for future Joint doctrine on strategic leadership. The logical question regarding DA PAM 600-80 is why is it a mere pamphlet? The answer is not readily apparent, but it appears the Army is presently fundamentally satisfied with the doctrine contained in FM 22-103, inspite of its aforementioned shortcomings, and is reluctant to more formally recognize the 'third dimension' of leadership, the strategic, until its warfighting doctrine catches up via FM 100-6. Of relevance is the recent appearance for staffing in draft of a new chapter for FM 22-103 entitled "Strategic Leadership". This document in its present form could logically

supplement the base manual's first seven chapters and provide the Army an 'off-the-shelf' solution to its present doctrinal shortfall.

Recent inquiries of Department of the Army and Joint Staff officers responsible for coordinating the development of doctrinal publications indicate there is currently no initiative or intent to develop a separate JCS publication which addresses the unique Joint and Combined leadership environment and the special skills and personality characteristics of the strategic leaders functioning in that environment. I could find no advocate for such an initiative on the JCS staff, although the need is clearly recognized by both practitioners in the field and scholars in the Senior Service Colleges. Acknowledgement and interest in the subject of strategic leadership is frequently seen in the context of the presentations made by four star CINCs or MACOM leaders at the War Colleges. These senior leaders often address the unique requirements of the strategic leader as he functions in an environment frequently external to his parent service and involving situations requiring great tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty. These leaders mention that a preponderance of their personal time is spent in contact and dialogue with agencies and departments outside the DOD, such as Congress and

the media. They describe critical capabilities most relevant to effectiveness at that level, including consensus building, compromise, public relations and exuding a strategic future vision, skills not normally needed at the lower levels of the leadership spectrum. The War Colleges themselves, particularly the Army War College and the National Defense University, recognize the existence of an echelon of leader responsibility above the operational and devote considerable classroom effort to its presentation and discussion. It would seem appropriate for one of these schools to be tasked by the JCS to take the lead in the development of strategic leadership doctrine. My recommendation would be for the NDU, assisted by the Army War College, to take on the task. Our leaders speak about it, our Senior Service Colleges teach it, our CINCs practice it and our military history catalogues it. It is now time we give it credibility and legitimacy by putting strategic leadership into a Joint publication for all to see and use.

EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP

While only the Army seems inclined to formally recognize a stratum of leadership above the operational, we have seen that its doctrine has not yet taken the giant step forward needed to make it formally happen. The bulk of the DOD establishment is

even further behind in its inclination to address the subject. The vast majority of the authoritative research on executive leadership has been focused in the civilian sector for the business application. The Army has commissioned or participated in several studies in recent years, however, which hold great promise for helping to fill the void that presently exists regarding scientifically based studies of strategic leadership.

The intellectual requirements for generalship were noted in a study conducted between 1978 and 1982 by Dr. David Campbell of the Center for Creative Leadership at Greensboro, North Carolina. His study of sixty-six Brigadier General designees, along with 1200 other mid and top-level civilian executives, revealed that the soon-to-be generals were highly intelligent and very well educated, indicating the probable need for such qualities in the officers selected for senior Army leadership.²⁰

Of more recent vintage is a superb study of General Officers at the senior level conducted by the Army Research Institute during the period 1984 to 1986. In this comprehensive study approximately two-thirds of the Army's incumbent three and four star general officers (and a selected group of civilian executives of comparable rank), were

interviewed and assessed. The purpose of the research was to better understand the nature of executive level work in the Army, to comprehend the effectiveness of the developmental process leading up to the position currently occupied by the generals being interviewed, and to test Elliott Jacque's theory of organizational structure and its relevance to developing future Army leaders and organization.²¹ There were 41 general officers in the sample, including eight four stars and thirty-three three stars, many of whom were in positions identified as Joint, Combined or Unified. The value of this study lies in its validation of the theory of organizational design described in DA PAM 600-80, and in its amplification and expansion of our understanding of the complexity of strategic leadership positions and the essential skills and character attributes needed for effective performance at that level.

The A.R.I. findings on the utility of executive leadership point to the "value added" by the incumbent to the overall mission effectiveness of the total organization. The strategic leader performs those tasks and functions clearly beyond the scope and capacity of subordinates and for which his cognitive abilities and unique qualities of character and temperament make him distinctly suitable. As succinctly stated in DA PAM 600-80, "tasks that cannot be delegated are critical and the

leader who does them makes a unique contribution ("adds value"). At the executive level, leaders use their frames of reference to understand complex and uncertain situations that their subordinate leaders lack the knowledge, experience or perspective to understand."²² The need for leaders possessing the capacity to provide strategic vision has probably never been greater than it is today as we stand on the threshold of a new order in world affairs. Executive leaders and CINCs throughout the world are responsible for shaping the military of the future. Decisions made today regarding force structure must be based on an accurate assessment of the threat to national security, tempered by the realities of constraining resources. Those officers appointed to make the truly tough decisions will be held accountable by history and the people of this country for their work. Only strategic leaders of very special capacity should be entrusted with these tremendous responsibilities and it is imperative that we formally acknowledge in our doctrine and in our selection processes the need for visionary leaders who can contribute the 'value added' needed for our continued strength as a world power.

THE STRATEGIC LEADER'S ENVIRONMENT

CINCs and other strategic leaders are required to function in what some would describe as a 'different world'. It indeed, is different from the environment of even the three-star Corps Commander, or the two-star Division Commander whose personal focus is the prosecution of the campaign plan and where effective operational plans, battles and engagements are the measure of success or failure. The strategic leader, however, operates in an environment which has been characterized as vague, unclear, complex and ambiguous, in the lexicon of the United States Army War College, an environment whose nature has been infrequently addressed in professional military literature and is conspicuously absent from our doctrine.

In a warfighting context involving a CINC in command of a multi-national force is found the most challenging environment of all for any leader. Major General Jacob Devers in a 1947 article shortly following the end of WWII outlined six factors which, in combination, resulted in an incredibly complex and demanding environment for the CINC, General Eisenhower. His points assume renewed relevance for today's military establishment as we wrestle with many of the same exigencies

needed for the effective prosecution of Joint and Combined operations. He characterized that environment as follows:

- . Seeking clarity and firmness of direction from higher.
- . Conflicting political economic and military problems and objectives of the multi-national force members.
- . Varying logistical capabilities, organization, doctrine and objectives of the allied powers.
- . Varying armament, training and tactical doctrine.
- . The essentiality of personal intervention and involvement by the CINC, especially in the early phases of operations.
- . The need for the CINC to understand the senior allied leader's capabilities and limitations.²³

DA PAM 600-80 addresses the topics of complexity and uncertainty encountered by the strategic leader, but does not place its discussion in a war fighting context. As a result, a CINC today must turn to the literature of the post World War II era to get a glimpse of what to expect if he should ever be required to actually fight his command in a Combined theater of war.

Jacque's and Jacob's research for A.R.I. brings the problem into clearer focus by providing a contemporary context,

but goes no further than DA DAM 600-80 in describing what amounts to the peacetime environment of a CINC's daily operation. They note the extreme complexity of the CINC's position which require "dealing with subordinates from different components of the armed forces - each of which has a somewhat different culture - or from different origins - in which case cultural differences may be substantial."²⁴ They also note that complexity could "stem from the number of reporting channels to which the incumbent is accountable."²⁵ In the case of the four-star CINCs, ten of the thirteen four star positions in the A.R.I. research were identified as having multiple channel reporting responsibilities, and some, such as CINC SHAPE, even had a political dimension with the requirement to report to NATO.

While there is a great need to articulate the nature of the strategic leader's environment, other authors would suggest the need for the CINC or senior leader to be able to not only know his environment, but to be able to shape it as well. In a recently published work on the role of senior leaders in developing their subordinates into 'Super-leaders', Manz and Sims in a discussion of Organizational Culture in the business world make the following important point; "top-level strategic management need not and should not restrict itself to traditional concerns such as the economy, market opportunities,

financial and product mixes, and the like. More specifically, successful Superleadership depends on the strategic creation of overarching cultural systems within which people can truly become self-leaders. Creating such environments will energize people and provide them with substitutes for bureaucratic control that can be flexibly adapted to varying situations. Within such systems human initiative, creativity, determination and inspiration can unfold".²⁶ General Eisenhower was depicted as a superleader in this work, as was Coach Joe Paterno. They both possessed the ability to not only know their respective cultures, but to shape them to their own design so as to produce the desired outcome, whether it be a victory on Saturday afternoon in the Orange Bowl or the restoration of liberty to a beleaguered Western European continent. Our doctrine must thoroughly address this important aspect of the strategic leadership equation if it is to have the desired utility of framing the context of an executive leader's many and varied duties and responsibilities.

KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS

A well developed and comprehensive aspect of leadership in the literature pertains to the knowledge, skills and abilities the senior leader must possess and exemplify for effective

performance. Both FM 22-103 and DA PAM 600-80 describe them in detail, as does the proposed chapter on "Strategic Leadership" in FM 22-103. As warfare grows in its complexity, and as operations in peacetime become ever more difficult in response to shrinking budgets and uncertain international military and political circumstances, it is incumbent upon our doctrine writers to look to the future, attempting to predict and describe the special competencies needed for effectiveness in the changing world of the strategic leader. Several reputable sources provide us a glimpse of the nature of the demand, our senior leaders will face in that rapidly approaching future.

Hunt and Blair have assembled a selection of the most reflective and visionary articles which look to that uncertain future in their 1986 book Leadership on the Future Battlefield. Joint doctrine writers could take their lead from this book in its focus on the war-fighting nature of the military profession, in contrast to the characteristic 'management' flavor found in DA PAM 600-80.

Future competencies noted in one chapter include "competence (technical skills and knowledge of unit operations); human relations (empathy, understanding people, consideration for subordinates); internal traits (intuition, judgment, personality, etc; management (analysis of problems,

decision making and application of management principles); communications (ability to read, write, speak and listen well); and leadership (motivation and direction of people."²⁷

Dr. Owen Jacob's article in the same reference also looks to the future and provides a vision of what he believes will be required of leaders in the ever more complex and deadly battlefield of the next war. His competencies, without elaboration, are as follows:

- . A frame of reference allowing understanding of the situation.
- . More initiative and foresight.
- . Higher technical competence.
- . The capacity to generate higher levels of unit cohesion.
- . The capacity to operate autonomously.
- . Greater flexibility and adaptability.
- . The capacity and opportunity to experiment.
- . The capacity to create.
- . An awareness of power and politics.²⁸

A major problem for strategic leadership doctrine writers is the "chaotic state of the current literature" in that it does not "deal with the future role and skill requirements of senior Army leaders."²⁹ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of


Staff's strategic vision should include his identification and articulation of this problem, and his directing the Joint Staff to coordinate a program of research focusing on the future strategic leader and his unique requirements and competencies.

Dr. Owen Jacob's 1986 A.R.I research would be an excellent interim solution to the question as it reflects the factor-analyzed opinions of currently serving strategic leaders on their most important personal characteristics and traits of temperament. As shown in Figure 3 by frequency of response, they are:

- . Multinational Perspective - an understanding of international culture, politics and sensitivities.
- . System perspective - necessity for knowledge of Joint and Combined Operations.
- . Consensus Building - securing agreements in the uncertain and complex multinational military environment.
- . Envisioning/Anticipating - looking to the future, anticipating change, establishing goals and shaping the environment.³⁰

The generals expressed a consensus on the necessity for possessing the above listed capabilities, but also mentioned several others with sufficient frequency as to merit their inclusion in any authoritative work on strategic leadership.

KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS STATED AS REQUISITE 3- AND 4-STAR POSITIONS



They included the following capabilities:

- Abstract or Conceptual Thought
- Values/Climate Setting
- Self-assessment
- Shared Frames of Reference
- Risk Taking/Uncertainty³¹

Jacobs notes that the majority of these characteristics, capabilities and competencies are precisely the same ones that other researchers of complex business organizations have identified as being applicable to the most effective, successful senior executives and CEOs. This correlation should give the Joint doctrine writer confidence in including their description in future efforts to shape the development of military literature on strategic leadership.

DEVELOPING STRATEGIC LEADERS

Officer 'education and training' is a topic normally associated with the formal schooling and technical skills preparations that an officer receives in his individual service up to and including the rank of colonel and highlighted by his

attendance at a Senior Service College. A CINC, however, may be appointed to a Unified or Specified Command somewhere around his 30th year of service. Are we to assume that his professional development is complete with his graduation from the War College? A search for the DOD or JCS plan, policy or program which describes the development of the senior Joint service executive or CINC will not be found, but that does not mean there is no need for such a program.

The only official recognition of a need for continuing development of the senior officer corps is found, surprisingly, in Congressional legislation! The Goldwater-Nichols law mandates the attendance of all brigadier general designees at an eight week Capstone course designed to enhance interservice understanding and to facilitate more effective performance by senior leaders when serving in Joint duty billets.

The Army's approach to executive development is logical and robust and could serve as the planning model for the DOD or the JCS program. Its program is already described in a pamphlet entitled "General Officer Training" and reflects the service's recognition of a continuing need for specialized education and training up to and including the rank of General. With the exception of the Joint Warfighters Course for generals going to Joint duties and the Capstone Course for all future

brigadiers, the military departments and the JCS are behind their civilian counterparts in formally addressing and committing resources to executive development programs. The Army's generals take advantage of programs at the Center for Creative Leadership which are tailored for individuals serving in CEO equivalent positions, such as four star CINCs. They attend management programs at civilian universities, such as Harvard and Columbia, designed to refine senior executive skills. Assuming that leaders, even strategic leaders, can learn from others in positions of similar complexity and responsibility, it is incumbent upon the JCS to insure the military services are developing and training future leaders with strategic vision and capability.

The leader development program should also be addressed in our Joint doctrine if we acknowledge that the most important resource in the military service is the capability and capacity of strategic leader. Recent research into the question of leader development reveals the existence of a number of very promising scientifically based tools which, if adapted by the military, could materially aid in both the selection and training of CINCs. Cognitive capacity assessment early in a career could identify those officers of particular promise³² and allow them to receive special

developmental tracks, including experiences such as the second year program at the Command and General Staff College at Ft. Levenworth, Kansas. More complete personality assessments, including feedback from instruments involving subordinates and peers, are available today and are in use at the National Defense University as a part of its core curriculum. Assessment center processes such as the one at the Center for Creative Leadership can provide officers and the services valuable insights into capability and potential. Concepts such as 'full stretch assignments'³³ which place officers in particularly demanding positions above their current levels of responsibility could accelerate the development of particularly effective leaders exhibiting truly exceptional potential. CINCs and our most senior Joint three star warfighters hold the nation's future in their hands and it is imperative that the JCS decision makers insure these special officers are properly prepared for their demanding duties. A coherent program of professionally rewarding assignments, periodic assessment center processes, and senior level educational and training courses, based on a solid foundation of doctrine delineating all aspects of Joint officer professional development, will begin to answer the mail.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is painfully clear that there has been virtually no attempt by the DOD or the JCS to develop doctrine and professional development concepts for the most senior and important military leaders, those performing in strategic leadership billets as CINCs or Major Command Commanders. The U.S. Army has taken the lead within the services in officially acknowledging the 'third dimension' of leadership and consciously supporting a developmental program for senior leaders on the path to the rank of general. While there are relatively few leaders in the entire military population who occupy positions which can legitimately be described as 'strategic', the importance of insuring these officers are the best available and are functioning in critical positions based on a sound doctrinal structure cannot be overstated. And yet to date the primary way of selecting them has been reliance on the judgement and intuition of other senior leaders and political figures. While the system has not failed our nation in the past, it makes great sense to take advantage of the many powerful evaluation and assessment tools which the behavioral sciences and military leadership oriented research can provide today to aid in both the development and selection of our nation's key military leaders.

Research continues into the skills, behaviors, and personality characteristics which contribute to transforming talented senior officers into effective strategic leaders. While a majority of that research has been in the non-military application, evidence exists of a strong relationship between the environment, skills, temperament and personality characteristics of the CEO of a major Fortune 500 corporation and the CINC of a Unified Command. The DOD and the JCS should aggressively charter new studies which build upon past research, such as that done by Jacques and Jacobs of A.R.I., with the intent of eventually producing a doctrinal publication which provides the strategic leader and his staff a cogent depiction of the environment of a Joint, Combined or Specified command, and the skills and attributes of senior leaders and their staff officers needed for effective 'value added' performance.

JCS sponsored studies should address the developmental processes which most effectively contribute to the growth and potential of officers of demonstrated outstanding capacity. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his quest for enlightened and visionary Joint and Unified Commanders, should task the National Defense University, in concert with the Army War College, to prepare the necessary JCS doctrinal

publication. The 'third dimension' of leadership is arguably the most critical in the military hierarchy and demands a thorough and comprehensive treatment in our professional literature if we are to properly and with certainty continue to provide for 'the common defense' of this great nation.

END NOTES

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